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broad waiver approach to inadvertent disclosure, it is submitted
that further judicial guidance is necessary. Although a client may
now avoid an automatic waiver of the attorney-client privilege
where he utilizes reasonable precautions to prevent an inadvertent
disclosure, it remains unclear what standard the New York courts
will use to determine whether a screening procedure is reasonable.
Hopefully, the Court of Appeals will soon provide appropriate
guidelines.
Scott Lawrence Lanin

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

"Emergency exception" search needs articulable facts leading to
the conclusion that a danger exists to be reasonable under the
fourth amendment
The fourth amendment 1 requires the police to obtain a warrant before conducting a search and seizure.2 There are a few
"well-delineated exceptions" to this requirement, including the
"emergency exception,'

3

which is applied when a situation requires

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Id.

2 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The Supreme Court has held that
warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable," subject to several recognized exceptions. Id.;
see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948) (fourth amendment "stays the
hands of the police unless they have a search warrant issued by a magistrate"); People v.
Vaccaro, 39 N.Y.2d 468, 472, 348 N.E.2d 886, 889, 384 N.Y.S.2d 411, 414 (1976) ("strong
judicial preference for search warrants").
The warrant clause of the fourth amendment ensures the protection of the people from
"unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy." United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977). "The purpose of a warrant is to allow a neutral
judicial officer to assess whether the police have probable cause to make an arrest or conduct a search." Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981); cf. Bloom, The Supreme
Court and its PurportedPreferencefor Search Warrants, 50 TENN. L. REV.231 (1983) (criticizing Supreme Court for not adhering to this principle).
3 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. Other generally recognized exceptions include: "consent"
to be searched, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); "plain view," see
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1982); "hot pursuit" of a fleeing felon, see Warden
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an immediate police response.4 Recently, in People v. Smith,5 the
Appellate Division, Second Department, held that for the warrantless search of a freight package to be constitutionally reasonable,
the officer must have had "articulable facts leading to the conclusion that there was a danger to life or property."'
In Smith, the Federal Aviation Administration had issued a
"terrorist alert" advising the airlines to screen shipments from
non-regular customers.7 A few days later, the defendant, who was
not a regular customer of the airline, delivered a package labeled
"surgical instruments" to an airfreight counter.8 The airline agent
shook the package and, upon hearing nothing, x-rayed it.9 The
agent became suspicious and called the airport police when the xray indicated that there was no metal in the box. 10 In x-raying the
package, the police also saw no metal, only two opaque cylinders."
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967); "automobile search," see United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 809 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); and "exigent circumstances," see Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213.
4 See P. POLYVIoU, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 189 (1982). The emergency exception has been
applied to "cases where the authorities were responding to miscellaneous emergency situations demanding immediate action." Id. Courts have applied the doctrine to diverse situations involving warrantless searches. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836, 838-39
(10th Cir. 1986) (search of suspicious small airplane); United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543,
544 (2d Cir.) (passing police officer searched house from where screams heard), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 1004 (1964); People v. Calhoun, 49 N.Y.2d 398, 402, 402 N.E.2d 1145, 1147-48, 426
N.Y.S.2d 243, 245 (1980) (search of house after fire).
The concept is generally supported by commentators, see generally 2 W. LAFAvE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.5(d), at 683-84 (2d ed. 1987) (warrantless search may be undertaken
upon reasonable belief that death or bodily harm is immenent), and is included in the
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 260.5 (1975).
5 135 App. Div. 2d 190, 525 N.Y.S.2d 244 (2d Dep't 1988).
8 Id. at 193, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 246.
1 Id. at 191, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 245. While neither the majority nor the dissent stated the
reason for the "terrorist alert," it is an important factor. The events of the Smith case took
place on June 29, 1985, see id. at 195, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 247 (Eiber, J., dissenting), and June
1985 had been fraught with terrorist activity against airports and airlines. In that month an
airplane was blown up on the ground, see N.Y. Times, June 13, 1985, at Al, col. 3; an American airplane with 104 passengers was hijacked, see N.Y. Times, June 15, 1985, at Al, col. 4;
an explosion occurred at Frankfurt Airport, see id. at col. 3; an airplane with over 300 passengers was blown up over the Atlantic Ocean, see N.Y. Times, June 24, 1985, at Al, col. 6;
and an explosion occurred at Tokyo Airport, see id.
8 Smith, 135 App. Div. 2d at 191, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 245. The package was delivered to
the freight desk of Eastern Airlines at La Guardia Airport in New York. Id.
OId.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 191-92, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 245. The officer could not determine the contents of
the package but thought it could have contained plastic explosives shipped without a detonator. Id. at 195-96, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 247 (Eiber, J., dissenting).
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The officer opened the package and found cocaine in it. 2 The defendant was arrested the following day when he came to retrieve
the package.13
At the suppression hearing, the lower court suppressed all the
evidence gathered as a result of this warrantless search. 14 The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the suppression order,15 concluding that the officer's action did not fall within the
emergency exception and, therefore, constituted an unreasonable
search.16
Writing for the court, Justice Sullivan noted both the longstanding policy of subjecting warrantless searches to judicial scrutiny to determine their reasonableness" and the prosecution's burden of justifying a warrantless search.' 8 Although the court recognized an "emergency exception" to the warrant requirement, l" it
reasoned that the existence of the emergency must be established
by "articulable facts leading to the conclusion that there was a
danger to life or property. '2° The court further supported its decision by noting that the police had failed to "comply with established procedures" for an airport emergency.21
Justice Eiber, dissenting vigorously, argued that in determin12 Id. at 192, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
13Id. at 196, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 248 (Eiber, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 191, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 244. The suppressed evidence included the contents of
the package, the defendant's post-arrest statements, and the identification of the defendant
in a lineup. Id. at 191, 195, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 244, 247.
15 Id. at 193, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 246.
26 Id. at 195, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
17 Id. at 191, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 244; see also United States v. Dowell, 724 F.2d 599, 602
(7th Cir.) (objective standard applied to determine reasonableness), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
906 (1984); People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 177, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246,
248 (judges "detached from the tension and drama of the moment" can balance competing
interests), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976).
" Smith, 135 App. Div. 2d at 191, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 244; see also Dowell, 724 F.2d at 602
(one factor in overcoming presumption against warrantless search was when identity of undercover informant subject to exposure); People v. Hodge, 44 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 378 N.E.2d
99, 101, 406 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738 (1978) (radio dispatch to police necessitating immediate inquiry into fatal stabbing overcame presumption against warrantless search). See generally
P. POLyvIOU, supra note 4, at 199 (discussing burden on states to show proper justification).
10 Smith, 135 App. Div. 2d at 191, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
20 Id. at 193, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 246. The court downplayed the significance of the "terrorist alert" in its consideration of the circumstances, stating that "[tihe so-called terrorist
alert... was an oral, nonspecific, warning concerning packages sent by nonregular companies or couriers." Id. at 192, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 245.
' Id. at 193, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 246. The court observed that it was "obvious from the
officer's failure to call the bomb squad [the established procedure] in this instance that he
did not consider that this package posed a serious threat." Id.
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ing the reasonableness of a law enforcement officer's action "the
governmental interest in conducting a warrantless search must be
balanced against the privacy interests of the defendant and the invasion which occurs as a result of the search."22 Justice Eiber asserted that in light of the government's paramount interest in
making airports and air transport safe,23 the advisory "terrorist
alert,"24 and the other suspicious circumstances surrounding the
package, the officer's action was reasonable.25
There is general agreement among the courts and commentators that it is difficult to clearly delineate the parameters of the
emergency exception.2" In People v. Mitchell, 7 the New York
Court of Appeals set forth a three-pronged test: 1) the police must
reasonably believe there is an emergency requiring their assistance
to protect life or property; 2) the primary motive of the search
must not be the gathering of evidence; and 3) there must be some
reasonable basis associating the place searched to the emergency.2"
In finding no emergency, the Smith court purported to follow
this test.29 It is suggested, however, that the court's requirement
22 Id. at 198, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 249 (Eiber, J., dissenting).

Id. (Eiber, J., dissenting).
Id. at 197, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 248 (Eiber, J., dissenting).
2. Id., 525 N.Y.S.2d at 248-49 (Eiber, J., dissenting). Justice Eiber further argued that
the minimal intrusion was reasonable because "any expectation of privacy the defendant
might otherwise have asserted was necessarily diminished by the fact that he willingly surrendered a package to a common carrier which bears the responsibility for monitoring what
is shipped on its conveyances." Id. at 199, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 249-50 (Eiber, J., dissenting).
Since the airline had a right to open the package without violating any constitutional rights
of the defendant, the officer's opening of the package "at the behest of the airline employee"
would not constitute a violation. Id. at 196, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 248 (Eiber, J., dissenting); see
also United States v. Sullivan, 544 F. Supp. 701, 710-11 (D. Me. 1982) (officer's opening of
package under similar circumstances ruled "technical assistance" to airline), af'd, 711 F.2d
1 (1st Cir. 1983).
2" See Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement
Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 419, 426 (1973). "The doctrine of emergency in the law of search and seizure has never been defined in terms of its overall concept.
The usual practice has been for a court to tailor its definition to the circumstances of each
case." Id. (footnote omitted). See generally P. PoLyvIou, supra note 4, at 189 (discussing
exigent circumstances emergency exception and courts' application thereof); 2 W. LAFAvE,
supra note 4, § 5.5(c), at 550 (same).
27 39 N.Y.2d 173, 347 N.E.2d 607, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976).
In Mitchell, the court observed that "[a]ppraising a particular situation to determine
whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless intrusion into a protected area
presents difficult problems of evaluation and judgment." Id. at 177, 347 N.E.2d at 609, 383
N.Y.S.2d at 248.
28 Id. at 177-78, 347 N.E.2d at 609, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
2 Smith, 135 App. Div. 2d at 195, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
13
.4
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that there be "articulable facts leading to the conclusion" that an
emergency exists3" is an unwarranted gloss upon the Mitchell test,
which requires only "reasonable belief." Had the Smith court applied the Mitchell test properly, it is submitted the court would
have found that all three prongs were satisfied. 1
Courts generally construe the exceptions to the warrant requirement narrowly in order to safeguard the rights guaranteed by
the fourth amendment.32 To determine the reasonableness of a
search, the public interest involved is balanced against the extent
of the intrusion.3 Courts also look for a level of information that
30

Id. at 193, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 246.
31 It should be noted that the court implicitly indicated that the second and third
prongs were not satisfied. See id. at 194-95, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 247. It would seem, however,
that those prongs were satisfied, as the officer had no motive for gathering evidence and the
package was clearly related to the emergency. The first prong of the Mitchell test presents a
closer question. The Mitchell court assumed the emergency should be an imminent one,
whereas the officer's conduct in Smith indicated no such imminence. Compare Mitchell, 39
N.Y.2d at 178, 347 N.E.2d at 610, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 249 with Smith, 135 App. Div. 2d at 193,
525 N.Y.S.2d at 246.
32 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967); People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335, 340, 229 N.E.2d 581, 585, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6
(1967). In Taggart, the court clearly stated that "[t]he discussion is not whether exigent
circumstances justify a departure from constitutional limitations. That view is impermissible. The point is that the constitution forbids 'unreasonable' searches and what is reasonable is determined by the circumstances and the exigencies are not to be ignored." Id.
The courts' strict construction is to safeguard individual rights against abuse by the
state. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977). To apply the emergency exception, courts require actual exigent circumstances; "mere inconvenience and delay attendant
upon the procurement of a warrant will not qualify as an exigent circumstance." Mascolo,
supra note 26, at 428. What will qualify as an exigent circumstance sufficient "to justify
seizure of evidence without a warrant must be determined on a case-by-case basis." United
States v. Morrow, 541 F.2d 1229, 1232 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 933 (1977).
33 The Constitution protects persons against "unreasonable" searches only. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV; see also Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 7 (warrant clause of Constitution "protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy");
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948) (guarantee of protection is for guilty
and innocent persons).
In deciding whether a case fits within the emergency exception, the courts have used a
balancing approach. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 544 F. Supp. 701, 718 (D. Me. 1982)
(court observed that "[t]he governmental interest in conducting an immediate warrantless
search must be balanced against the privacy interest of the defendant in the package"),
aff'd, 711 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983); Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d at 180, 347 N.E.2d at 611, 383 N.Y.S.2d
at 250 (in homicide case, "[c]onstitutional guarantees of privacy and sanctions against their
transgression do not exist in a vacuum but must yield to paramount concerns for human life
and the legitimate need of society to protect and preserve life"); People v. Fritschler, 81
Misc. 2d 106, 111, 364 N.Y.S.2d 801, 806 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1975) (airport x-ray
search in which court observed that it was "only a limited invasion of defendant's rights
which was more than warranted by the nature of the harm sought to be prevented-a possible bomb explosion on an aircraft").
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would approximate "probable cause" to determine the reasonableness of the police response. 4 While this requirement is necessary
to deter law enforcement agents from acting on mere suspicion, it
is suggested that when important public places are involved, such
as airports or other generally accessible public buildings, courts
should be satisfied with a lower level of information because of the
potentially great harm to life and property. 5 The government's inThe determination of reasonableness is significant because if a search cannot withstand
this test the evidence seized in that search is suppressed. The Supreme Court adopted this
exclusionary rule for the enforcement of the fourth amendment in Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), and through the fourteenth amendment extended its application to
the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925) (measure of legality of
search and seizure is reasonable or probable cause). The Constitution requires "probable
cause" for the issuance of warrants. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has established that reasonably trustworthy evidence must be shown to establish "probable cause."
See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). The same threshold level of
information has generally been required in determining the reasonableness of warrantless
searches as well. See United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94, 100-01 (4th Cir. 1962); United
States v. Lawrence, 434 F. Supp. 441, 444-45 (D.D.C. 1977).
Courts have allowed greater latitude to police officers when their own safety, or the
public safety, is involved. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (officer's safety outweighs de minimis intrusion on rights); Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d at 339, 229
N.E.2d at 584, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 6 (information inadequate to establish probable cause can be
sufficient for search when "exigencies affecting life, limb, or grave property damage" are
involved). Courts have, however, closely scrutinized officers' actions to deter abuses. See,
e.g., Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15 (searching footlocker several hours after arrest not reasonable
because danger had passed); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (police need to
search only area under "immediate control" of person).
" There is general agreement that these areas are "'critical zone[s]' where special considerations apply" because of the magnitude of the potential damage. See State v. Johnson,
529 S.W.2d 658, 662 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). There is also a consensus that "[many of the
existing exceptions to the warrant requirement clearly have no relevance to airport
searches." Note, The Constitutionality of Airport Searches, 72 MiCH. L. Rav. 128, 137
(1973). However, as one commentator has stated:
[A]s courts have candidly acknowledged, such searches seem, especially in view of
the necessity for and the overwhelming public acceptance of anti-hijacking systems, to be reasonable; and there is little doubt that currently used airport procedures have had considerable success in reducing the number of successful hijackings and hijacking attempts. Courts have therefore made valiant efforts to uphold
the basic constitutionality of airport security procedures.
P. PoLyvIou, supra note 4, at 254 (footnotes omitted). But see McGinley & Downs, Airport
Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 293, 313-24 (1972)
(arguing that airport searches are both unreasonable and unconstitutional). For a discussion
of the airport security changes and their constitutional ramifications, see Abramovsky, The
Constitutionality of the Anti-Hijacking Security System, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 123, 127-44
(1972).
Courts have generally been sympathetic to proper, but intrusive, security measures in
public places. See McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1978) (security search
entering courthouse reasonable because introduced in response to violence).
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terest in the continued beneficial use of such places justifies this
reasonable limitation upon an individual's rights.3 6
In light of the paramount interest of public safety, it is submitted that the Smith court failed to balance the predicament
faced by the officer with the extent of his violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights. The court's holding, with its unnecessarily stringent requirements for the determination of the existence of an emergency, will hamper the ability of police to
protect society against potentially great harm to life and property.
Simon Yeznig Balian

CPL § 195.10: Criminal defendant may not waive grand jury indictment and consent to be prosecuted by superior court information after indictment is filed
Traditionally, the New York Constitution has mandated that
the prosecution of all capital or otherwise infamous crimes be initiated by grand jury indictment.1 This right was designed to safe" See People v. Kuhn, 33 N.Y.2d 203, 210, 306 N.E.2d 777, 780, 351 N.Y.S.2d 649, 654
(1973). The governmental interest tends to be paramount to the individual right of privacy
in these places, and often the level of exigency required will be less than in other circumstances. See United States v. Licata, 761 F.2d 537, 543 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[o]rdinarily, in the
airport setting, exigent circumstances are apparent"). See generally Halbrook, Firearms,
The Fourth Amendment, and Air CarrierSecurity, 52 J. Am L. & CoM. 585 (1987) (comprehensive discussion of screening practices and legislative history of government regulations). The extent of the governmental interest is succinctly illustrated in the following observation of a distinguished judge: "When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human
lives and millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large
airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness ....
"United States v. Bell, 464
F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972).
1 See N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6; see also People v. Miles, 289 N.Y. 360, 362, 45 N.E.2d 910,
911 (1942) ("fundamental principle of our government" that indictment precede prosecution
for infamous crime); People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N.Y. 314, 317, 164 N.E. 111,
111 (1928) ("organic law decrees that no one shall be held to answer for an infamous crime
until after a grand jury shall have considered the evidence against him"). Prior to the 1973
amendment, the New York Constitution had provided: "No person shall be held to answer
for a capital or otherwise infamous crime ...
unless on presentment or indictment of a
grand jury." N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, § 6 (1894, amended 1973).
Under the CPL an indictment is defined as "a written accusation by a grand jury, filed
with a superior court, charging a person... with the commission of a crime." CPL § 200.10
(McKinney 1982). A grand jury hearing serves "chiefly [as] an accusatory instrument; its
indictment carries no presumption of guilt, but is merely a means of informing the accused

